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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002962

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DEPT FOR NP/ECC- YWONG, ACHURCH, BGOLDEN
DOE/NNSA- TPERRY, LPARKER, EDESCHLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2017

TAGS: [ETTC](#) [KNNP](#) [KSTC](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [TU](#)

SUBJECT: EXBS: TURKISH ATOMIC ENERGY AUTHORITY REQUESTS
JOINT NONPROLIFERATION THREAT ASSESSMENT

REF: ANKARA 02527

Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Carl Siebentritt for reason
s 1.4(b,d).

¶1. (U) Action request at para 5.

2.(C) Summary: The Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) has requested that the USG send a team of experts to conduct a joint nuclear smuggling threat assessment with TAEK to obtain a better understanding of the threat to Turkey of proliferation of nuclear materials. We believe this assessment would be useful in encouraging TAEK buy-in to future EXBS and SLD initiatives, and request ISN/ECC investigate the feasibility of sending a team of U.S. experts to Turkey for such an assessment. End summary.

¶3. (C) We met with TAEK President Okay Cakiroglu and his staff to discuss EXBS and SLD program initiatives for Turkey. It was clear that TAEK is not in favor of accepting DOE's Second Line of Defense equipment plan as currently conceived and desires maximum control of other radiation detection equipment which may be provided to Turkish agencies (reftel).

He asserted the new Turkish-developed radiation detection monitors and hand-held equipment would provide a more secure system for Turkey and reduce the risk of "backdoor" access by "other" entities. He noted TAEK has already built over 100 monitors to date and has begun installation of these units at border points of entry where U.S. built portal monitors currently operate.

¶4. (C) Cakiroglu stated that TAEK desires a joint U.S.-Turkey "Nonproliferation Threat Assessment" to identify specific nonproliferation risks for Turkey and to better help them understand the concerns the U.S. has in those regards. TAEK might then be willing to work cooperatively with the U.S. to develop a suitable radiation detection equipment program for implementation in Turkey. Visiting EXBS Program Officer agreed to look into the possibility of sending a team of U.S. experts to conduct a joint threat assessment in the near term.

¶5. (C) COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: TAEK is a key GOT actor on issues related to non-proliferation. Turkish Customs and Turkish National Police have told us privately that TAEK's reluctance to accept U.S. assistance and equipment is an obstacle to more active bilateral cooperation on improving Turkey's export control and border security capabilities. Post believes a positive response to TAEK's request for a joint nuclear smuggling threat assessment will encourage

TAEK's buy-in to our efforts to equip and train relevant Turkish agencies. We therefore request that ISN/ECC coordinate with DOE INECP, SLD, and other relevant agencies to determine feasibility, scope, and possible dates for a joint threat assessment with TAEK and other GOT entities in the near future. EXBS Advisor Robert Cieslinski and Pol-Mil Officer Robert Lee will serve as post POCs for this initiative.

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